【2020年11月05日】SEC監(jiān)管案例: SEC控訴1億美元會(huì)計(jì)欺詐-虛增收入(通過(guò)隱蔽關(guān)聯(lián)方)

本文中英文6300字，細(xì)節(jié)較多，建議打印后閱讀。
本篇是SEC監(jiān)管案例系列第1篇。
美國(guó)證券法律、會(huì)計(jì)、監(jiān)管制度與國(guó)內(nèi)均不同，為何要寫SEC監(jiān)管案例分析？一則因?yàn)?，SEC動(dòng)輒幾十頁(yè)控訴狀，對(duì)比國(guó)內(nèi)證監(jiān)會(huì)和交易所幾頁(yè)紙的公函和決定書，會(huì)披露更多的案情細(xì)節(jié)可供分析琢磨；二則小法認(rèn)為，兩個(gè)不同證券體系下流動(dòng)的商業(yè)交易本質(zhì)，其實(shí)有很多共通之處。為此，在SEC監(jiān)管案例系列中，小法會(huì)盡量跳開(kāi)美國(guó)體系下特有之處，更多探討相同、相似之處，以給讀者關(guān)于國(guó)內(nèi)上市公司監(jiān)管與合規(guī)更多思考的靈感。
本文案例涉及SEC在2020年10月8日發(fā)布的公告（No.2020-251），控訴SAE公司及4位前高管（“涉案高管”）涉嫌會(huì)計(jì)欺詐。會(huì)計(jì)欺詐行為涉及持續(xù)多年虛增收入約1億美元及涉案高管隱瞞盜用公司資金數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元。
SEC控訴狀49頁(yè)，小法在本文中對(duì)SEC控訴狀的摘錄，側(cè)重于討論：
1) SAE公司隱瞞關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系的手段，以增加讀者在盡職調(diào)查等實(shí)務(wù)工作中識(shí)別隱蔽關(guān)聯(lián)方的經(jīng)驗(yàn)；
2）SAE公司通過(guò)隱蔽關(guān)聯(lián)方虛增收入的套路；
3）會(huì)計(jì)欺詐賠償責(zé)任的相關(guān)美國(guó)證券法規(guī)。
本文英文部分（含序號(hào)）摘自SEC控訴狀原文，中文部分含小法對(duì)案情的分析并按中文閱讀習(xí)慣書寫，非逐句翻譯，亦省略非關(guān)鍵信息。若想更好了解本案，建議英文部分一并閱讀。

Factual Allegations
事實(shí)指控

Defendants
被告涉案方

1. This enforcement action arises from an elaborate, four?year?long fraud by Defendant SAExploration Holdings, Inc. (“SAE” or the “Company”) and four former senior SAE executives, Jeffrey H. Hastings (former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of SAE’s Board of Directors), Brent N. Whiteley (former Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel), Brian A. Beatty (former Chief Operations Officer and, prior to that, Chief Executive Officer), and Michael J. Scott (former Executive Vice President of Operations).
2. SAE is a publicly traded seismic data acquisition company. SAE’s customers, mainly large oil and gas companies, hire SAE to collect (or “shoot”) proprietary seismic survey data used to identify and assess potential drilling locations. SAE historically struggled to maintain sufficient cash flow – a problem only exacerbated by a decline in oil prices beginning in late 2014 and into early 2015.

本案涉事公司SAE公司主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)系向大型油氣公司客戶提供地震數(shù)據(jù)，因2014年底開(kāi)始油價(jià)下跌，SAE出現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流吃緊。本案涉事高管：Hastings（前CEO兼董事長(zhǎng)）、Whiteley（前CFO兼法律總顧問(wèn)）、Beatty（前COO）、Scott（前運(yùn)營(yíng)執(zhí)行總裁）。

A. The Defendants Created A Purportedly Unaffiliated Data Library Company

通過(guò)隱蔽關(guān)聯(lián)方虛增收入的套路：涉案高管設(shè)立表面上非關(guān)聯(lián)的數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)公司

3. From as early as February 2015 through August 2019 (the “Relevant Period”), SAE and Hastings, Whiteley, Beatty, and Scott (the “SAE Executives”), devised and carried out a fraud to improperly recognize approximately $100 million of revenue from transactions with a purportedly legitimate and unrelated customer, Alaskan Seismic Ventures, LLC (“ASV”). In truth, however, ASV was created by the SAE Executives and controlled by Hastings and Whiteley.

自2015年2月至2019年8月（“涉案期間”），SAE與Hastings, Whiteley, Beatty和Scott（“涉案高管”）在涉案期間，通過(guò)與ASV的交易，以欺詐手段不適當(dāng)確認(rèn)約1億美元收入。ASV表面看似一家SAE非關(guān)聯(lián)方公司，但實(shí)際上，其背后由SAE涉案高管設(shè)立，并由Hastings和Whiteley實(shí)際控制。

34. Creating a purportedly unaffiliated entity to operate the data library offered three primary benefits.
36. Second, if the data library company appeared to be an unaffiliated third party, SAE could potentially recognize the revenue as it “sold” data to the third?party special purpose entity (“SPE”) – without having to identify and contract with actual end ?user customers.

設(shè)立ASV這樣一家形式上非關(guān)聯(lián)而實(shí)質(zhì)上關(guān)聯(lián)的數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)公司，對(duì)SAE有三個(gè)好處，其中之一就是，SAE確認(rèn)收入的時(shí)點(diǎn)是SAE將數(shù)據(jù)“銷售”給ASV之時(shí)，而在該等收入確認(rèn)之前，SAE不需要確認(rèn)ASV的最終用戶是否實(shí)際存在。

40. In April 2015, Hastings recruited a business acquaintance, a former Director of the State of Alaska Oil and Gas Division, to establish a seismic data library company (the “ASV Owner”). Hastings’ business acquaintance formed ASV as an Alaska limited liability company in May 2015. None of the SAE Executives were identified on ASV’s organization documents. The ASV Owner was ASV’s sole employee and operated it out of a bedroom in his personal residence.

ASV公司成立于2015年4月，公司僅有一名雇員，同時(shí)也是公司唯一股東（“ASV所有者”），此人系Hastings業(yè)務(wù)熟人。另外，沒(méi)有一名涉案高管的名字出現(xiàn)在ASV組織架構(gòu)文件中。

41. On July 1, 2015, SAE entered into a Master Services Agreement (“MSA”) with ASV, whereby SAE contracted to collect seismic data for ASV. The ASV Owner signed the MSA for ASV, and Scott signed on behalf of SAE. Soon thereafter, SAE and ASV executed five work orders pursuant to the MSA, for five data exploration locations in Alaska. Scott signed the first two work orders on behalf of SAE.

2015年7月，SAE與ASV簽訂《總服務(wù)協(xié)議》，依此協(xié)議SAE向ASV提供地震數(shù)據(jù)。ASV所有者代表ASV簽訂該協(xié)議，Scott代表SAE簽訂該協(xié)議。

42. Although ASV was structured as a purportedly independent third party, Hastings and Whiteley effectively controlled ASV, as Beatty and Scott knew or were reckless in not knowing. Whiteley provided administrative and operational support to the ASV Owner, including, for example, providing him with contract templates and identifying potential financing opportunities for ASV. In addition, Hastings, Whiteley, and Scott located customers to license data from ASV – including customers who previously had purchased data directly from SAE. Indeed, SAE employees even negotiated directly with SAE customers on behalf of ASV.

對(duì)于這家表面上毫無(wú)關(guān)系的公司，涉案高管可謂操碎了心。比如，Whiteley向ASV所有者提供行政運(yùn)營(yíng)支持，包括提供合同范本和潛在融資機(jī)會(huì)。Hastings, Whiteley和Scott幫助ASV尋找客戶購(gòu)買數(shù)據(jù)，其中有些客戶甚至以前曾向SAE購(gòu)買數(shù)據(jù)。甚至有，SAE職員以ASV公司名義與SAE客戶進(jìn)行業(yè)務(wù)談判。

B. The SAE Executives Misappropriated from SAE $12 Million and Covertly Invested Approximately Half In ASV
隱瞞關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系的手段：涉案高管從SAE盜取1200萬(wàn)美元，將其中約600萬(wàn)美元隱蔽投資于ASV公司

43. Beginning in June 2015, SAE began recognizing as revenue amounts owed to it by ASV. From the time of ASV’s creation in May 2015, the SAE Executives understood that ASV did not have sufficient funds to pay SAE pursuant to the MSA and that to pay SAE, ASV would need to generate cash from various sources, including finding third parties to license the data collected, by monetizing ASV’s Alaska Tax Credits, or otherwise finding sources of equity for ASV.
But, as of the fall of 2015 (and throughout the Relevant Period), ASV had only limited sales to licensees – and nothing close to what SAE recognized as revenue from its sales to ASV. Because ASV lacked funds to pay SAE amounts due under the MSA, SAE’s accounts receivable balance from ASV began to increase substantially over time. For example, by the end of 2015, SAE had recorded $83 million in revenue from ASV – $50 million of which remained outstanding as an account receivable.

ASV自2015年設(shè)立后，從其客戶獲取的數(shù)據(jù)授權(quán)業(yè)務(wù)收入極其有限，導(dǎo)致ASV對(duì)SAE出現(xiàn)大量應(yīng)付款，與SAE確認(rèn)的銷售收入形成強(qiáng)烈反差。比如，2015年末，SAE確認(rèn)從ASV銷售收入為8300萬(wàn)美元，但其中5000萬(wàn)美元為應(yīng)收款，占60%。
試想一下，若一家公司的客戶應(yīng)付款比例已高達(dá)全部交易額60%，而該公司既不修改合同條款增加違約金、亦不修改賬期，仍按現(xiàn)狀繼續(xù)與客戶做生意，不可疑嗎？涉案高管當(dāng)然都想到了這一點(diǎn)，所以，為ASV公司增加現(xiàn)金流，成了SAE涉案高管費(fèi)盡心思的共同任務(wù)。

48. The SAE Executives knew that an overt investment by SAE in ASV would derail their plan. At a minimum, it would render ASV an SAE affiliate, requiring consolidation of ASV into SAE’s financial statements and precluding the recognition of revenue from SAE’s transactions with ASV. It would also reduce the amount of Alaska Tax Credits that ASV would receive.
49. By no later than October 2015, the SAE Executives were aware of and actively participating in the illegal plan to make a covert equity investment in ASV, including by devising a plan to route funds from SAE, through various shell companies created and controlled by Whiteley and Hastings, to ASV.

涉案高管心里清楚，若關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系暴露，ASV將作為關(guān)聯(lián)方并入SAE合并報(bào)表，SAE從ASV確認(rèn)的收入也將合并抵銷，由此SAE合并財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表上收入科目的金額將出現(xiàn)大幅下滑。為此，涉案高管積極謀劃，將從SAE盜取的資金，通過(guò)隱蔽股權(quán)投資的方式投入到ASV。具體手段是，通過(guò)設(shè)立Whiteley和Hastings控制的4家空殼公司，以實(shí)現(xiàn)資金閉環(huán)。

63. The below diagram demonstrates the flow of misappropriated funds from SAE to ASV, specifically:
a. the misappropriation of $12 million via transfers to Global Equipment;
b. the routing of $5.9 million, through shell companies, to ASV; and
c. the round tripping of $5.8 million back to SAE in December 2015.
Round Tripping of Nearly $6 Million in Misappropriated SAE Funds

上述圖表系SEC調(diào)查出來(lái)的涉案高管一手操縱的隱蔽資金閉環(huán)。除SAE、ASV，其余4家公司Global Equipment (“GES”), Forza, Madison River 和Palmyra均系涉案高管控制的假冒空殼公司。

C. The SAE Executives “Round Tripped” Nearly $6 Million Through ASV and Back To SAE To Create the False Impression ASV Was Paying SAE
隱瞞關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系的手段：通過(guò)假冒空殼公司，進(jìn)行隱蔽股權(quán)投資，實(shí)現(xiàn)資金閉環(huán)

50. Global Equipment was a sham company created by the SAE Executives in September 2015. In 2015 and 2016, Scott created fake and back?dated purchase orders and supporting documentation purporting to provide for SAE’s rental of equipment from Global Equipment for seismic?data surveys SAE had been conducting. In addition, Whiteley directed the drafting of a fake lease agreement between SAE and Global Equipment and of fake invoices from Global Equipment to SAE.

51. But Global Equipment did not actually own any such survey equipment, and the non?existent rentals were fabricated in order to provide a cover story for the misappropriation and routing of SAE money to ASV.

53. Between October 2015 and December 2016, the SAE Executives caused SAE to transfer approximately $12 million to Global Equipment.

第一步：SAE將盜取的1200萬(wàn)美元資金，通過(guò)虛構(gòu)的設(shè)備租賃交易，轉(zhuǎn)移至空殼公司GES。在此虛構(gòu)業(yè)務(wù)中，Scott偽造、倒簽租賃設(shè)備的訂單和支持性文件；Whiteley指示起草虛假的租賃協(xié)議、發(fā)票；而實(shí)際上GES公司不擁有任何租賃設(shè)備可供出租。

56. In October and November 2015, Whiteley caused $6.3 million to be transferred from Global Equipment to two additional shell companies he and Hastings controlled. First, on or about October 26, 2015, Whiteley caused $3 million to be sent from Global Equipment to Forza Investments, an entity he controlled and created. Second, in November 2015, Whiteley caused an additional $3.3 million to be sent from Global Equipment to Madison River Investments, an entity Hastings controlled and created.

57. Next, approximately $6.1 million was transferred from Forza Investments and Madison River Investments – via a $2.8 million transfer in November 2015 and a $3.28 million transfer in December 2015, respectively – to a third entity called Palmyra Energy. Whiteley directed his neighbor to form Palmyra Energy in or around September 2015, to invest in ASV. To date, Palmyra Energy has received funds from no sources other than Forza Investments and Madison River Investments.
58. On or around December 4, 2015, Palmyra Energy used $5.9 million of the $6.1 million from Forza Investments and Madison River Investments to invest in ASV. As a result, Palmyra Energy – and in turn Whiteley and Hastings, who controlled Palmyra Energy – obtained an 85% ownership stake in ASV.


第二步，Whiteley安排將GES公司收到的1200萬(wàn)美元中630萬(wàn)美元，分兩筆分別支付給另2家空殼公司Forza（Whiteley設(shè)立和控制）和Madison River（Hastings設(shè)立和控制）。

第三步，F(xiàn)orza和Madison River 將收到的資金轉(zhuǎn)移給第4家空殼公司Palmyra（Whiteley指示其鄰居設(shè)立）。Palmyra從2015年設(shè)立至SEC控訴之日，沒(méi)有Forza和Madison River之外的任何資金來(lái)源。
第四步，Palmyra將收到的資金，以股權(quán)投資的方式投資ASV公司85%股權(quán)。
通過(guò)前述四步驟，涉案高管將從SAE盜取的1200萬(wàn)美元資金中約600萬(wàn)美元轉(zhuǎn)移至ASV，ASV用此資金支付對(duì)SAE的業(yè)務(wù)款待付支票，以降低SAE財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表上應(yīng)收款金額，進(jìn)而隱藏其會(huì)計(jì)欺詐違法行為。剩余600萬(wàn)美元，涉案高管通過(guò)空殼公司和虛假文件等相似手段，私吞至個(gè)人賬戶。

Materially False and Misleading Statements in SAE’s Public Filings

SAE公開(kāi)披露中的重大虛假、誤導(dǎo)性陳述
通過(guò)上述“事實(shí)指控”部分，我們了解到SAE通過(guò)4家空殼公司及眾多虛假交易文件，隱瞞關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系，進(jìn)而虛增約1億美元營(yíng)業(yè)收入，由此當(dāng)然會(huì)引發(fā)SAE及涉案高管在上市公司定期財(cái)報(bào)、公告等披露中一系列重大虛假、誤導(dǎo)性陳述。該等重大虛假、誤導(dǎo)性陳述與國(guó)內(nèi)情形類似，具體有：

• 82. SAE’s financial statements were materially false because, contrary to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), SAE recognized revenue and disclosed accounts receivable balances from ASV as if the revenue and receivables were generated from legitimate, substantive transactions with an unaffiliated company, which Hastings, Whiteley, and Beatty knew was not true.
  將SAE與ASV大量的商業(yè)交易按照與一家合法非關(guān)聯(lián)方進(jìn)行交易來(lái)確認(rèn)和披露收入、應(yīng)收款，該等會(huì)計(jì)處理違反GAAP準(zhǔn)則，系重大虛假陳述；
  
• 83. From the second quarter of 2015 through the second quarter of 2016, SAE recognized $141 million in revenue from ASV. Of that amount, only $40 million was generated from legitimate end?user licensees. As a result, SAE materially overstated its revenue by approximately $100 million from the second quarter of 2015 through the second quarter of 2016 – which constituted approximately 36% of SAE’s revenue reported in its financial statements for the period. Accordingly, SAE’s Forms 10?Q for that period and its Forms 10?K for 2015 and 2016 were materially false.
  
  

84. Likewise, SAE’s subsequent Forms 10?K and 10?Q, from the third quarter of 2016 through the first quarter of 2019, were also materially false because they either incorporated the artificially?inflated revenue from 2015 and/or 2016 or materially overstated accounts receivable owed by ASV.

85. In addition, SAE’s Forms 8?K incorporating and attaching SAE’s quarterly and annual earnings releases for the period June 2015 through March 2019 – all 16 of which Whiteley signed – were also materially false.

在某一財(cái)報(bào)期間，SAE確認(rèn)來(lái)自ASV的1.41億美元銷售收入中，只有0.4億美元來(lái)自于ASV的真實(shí)客戶，因此，SAE虛增收入1億美元，占當(dāng)期全部收入比例高達(dá)36%。由于收入虛增，SAE財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中應(yīng)收款、收益科目也虛增。

• 87. SAE’s public filings during the same period, in particular SAE’s Forms 10?K and 10?Q, contained the following, additional material misstatements and omissions made by SAE, Hastings, Whiteley, and Beatty:
  a. They materially mischaracterized ASV as a legitimate third?party customer, responsible for large percentages of SAE’s revenue. For example, SAE’s 2016 Form 10?K, signed by Hastings and Beatty, identified ASV as a customer accounting for more than 10% in consolidated revenue that year but did not disclose that the revenue was improperly recognized.
  虛假稱述ASV是一家為SAE貢獻(xiàn)高比例營(yíng)收的合法第三方客戶，該虛假陳述系重大虛假陳述；
  c. They contained materially misleading related party information by failing to disclose or include ASV as a related party. For example, SAE’s 2016 Form 10?K disclosed certain related parties owned and controlled by Hastings but did not identify ASV as a related party created by the SAE Executives and controlled by Hastings or Whiteley.
  
  

  
未披露ASV是關(guān)聯(lián)方，導(dǎo)致重大誤導(dǎo)性關(guān)聯(lián)方信息披露；

d. They contained materially misleading executive? compensation information by failing to include amounts misappropriated by the SAE Executives. For example, SAE’s 2016 Form 10?K incorporated by reference SAE’s 2017 Proxy Statement, which provided 2016 compensation information for the SAE Executives but failed to disclose the amounts each obtained from SAE through the fraudulent use of Global Equipment.

  由于涉案高管侵占公司資金約600萬(wàn)美元，導(dǎo)致重大誤導(dǎo)性高管薪酬信息披露；

e. They contained materially misleading information regarding SAE’s transactions with Global Equipment by, for example, failing to disclose that Global Equipment was a sham rental equipment company created and controlled by the SAE Executives. For example, SAE’s 2015 Form 10?K, signed by Beatty and Whiteley, did not identify Global Equipment as a related party or disclose the approximately $6.8 million paid from SAE to Global Equipment that year.

  對(duì)SAE交易方GES公司的披露信息系重大誤導(dǎo)性陳述；

  g. SAE’s financial statements improperly included funds misappropriated by the SAE Executives as supposedly legitimate business expenses. For example, amounts stolen by Whiteley and paid to RVI and other fictitious entities were booked as legal or consulting expenses in SAE’s financial statements throughout the Relevant Period.

SAE財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表將涉案高管侵占資金不恰當(dāng)記為營(yíng)業(yè)費(fèi)用。

• 109. Hastings, Whiteley, and Beatty lied to SAE’s auditors, in connection with audits and reviews of SAE during the Relevant Period.
  110. Specifically, Whiteley, Hastings, and Beatty signed management representation letters to SAE’s auditors that each knew contained material misstatements.
  涉案高管向其審計(jì)師就審計(jì)審閱期間相關(guān)事宜撒謊，特別是高管聲明書中包含大量重大不實(shí)陳述。
  
  

Concerned U.S. Securities Regulations
相關(guān)美國(guó)證券法規(guī)

從上述兩個(gè)章節(jié)（藍(lán)色底標(biāo)注）“事實(shí)指控”和“SAE公開(kāi)披露中的重大虛假、誤導(dǎo)性陳述”，我們可知，其實(shí)SAE通過(guò)隱瞞關(guān)聯(lián)方虛增收入的手段并不“高明”，在國(guó)內(nèi)被處罰處分的上市公司中也常見(jiàn)類似操作；SEC指控SAE對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表所做的重大虛假、誤導(dǎo)性陳述，也與國(guó)內(nèi)類似。那么，大家可能會(huì)好奇，SAE和涉案高管將被索賠多少呢？

在SEC控訴狀中，并未提及具體索賠金額，但SEC提起的救濟(jì)請(qǐng)求事項(xiàng)多達(dá)18項(xiàng)，提到的被告違反的美國(guó)證券法規(guī)也很多，具體如下：
Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Section20(e) [15 U.S.C.§ 77t(e)]
Section10(b) [15 U.S.C.§ 78j(b)] and Rules 10(b)-5(a) &(b)& (c) thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)&(b)&(c)]
Section 13(a) [15 U.S.C.§ 78m(a)] and Rules 13a-1&11&13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1&11&13]
Section 12b-20 [17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20]
Section 13(b)(2)(A)&(B) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A)&(B)]
Section 13(b)(5) ) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(5)] and Rule 13b2-1 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1]
Section 13b2-2 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2]
Rule 13a-14 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14]
Section 21(d)(5) [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5)]
Securities Act of 1933
Section 17(a)(1)&(2)&(3) [15 U.S.C.§ 77q(a)(1)&(2)&(3)]
Section 15(b) [15 U.S.C.§ 77o(b)]
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)
Section 304(a)&(b) [15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)&(b)]
下面選與賠償有關(guān)的法規(guī)作介紹，雖然我們不知道具體索賠總金額，但通過(guò)這些法規(guī)，可大概知道賠償?shù)摹坝?jì)算單價(jià)”。
Section 21(d) [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)]

(d)Injunction proceedings; authority of court to prohibit persons from serving as officers and directors; money penalties in civil actions
禁止令程序、禁止擔(dān)任高管、董事；民事訴訟程序中金錢賠償

(2)Authority of Court To Prohibit Persons From Serving as Officers and Directors.
禁止擔(dān)任高管、董事

In any proceeding under paragraph (1) of this subdiv, the court may prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it shall determine, any person who violated div 78j(b) of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder from acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to div 78l of this title or that is required to file reports pursuant to div 78o(d) of this title if the person’s conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.
本案中SAE和涉案高管的會(huì)計(jì)欺詐行為屬于違反div 78j(b)的行為，對(duì)于違反div 78j(b)的個(gè)人，若法院認(rèn)為其行為顯示其已不適合擔(dān)任上市公司高管或董事，法院可有條件或無(wú)條件的，決定其永久的或在某一期間內(nèi)，禁止擔(dān)任上市公司高管或董事。

(3) Money Penalties in Civil Actions.—
民事訴訟程序中金錢賠償

(A) Authority of commission.—
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist order entered by the Commission pursuant to div 78u–3 of this title, other than by committing a violation subject to a penalty pursuant to div 78u–1 of this title, the Commission may bring an action in a United States district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who committed such violation.
除div 78u-1關(guān)于內(nèi)幕交易的處罰另有規(guī)定外，對(duì)于本章節(jié)下的違法行為（本案會(huì)計(jì)欺詐屬于此情形）責(zé)任人，SEC可在美國(guó)地區(qū)法院提起民事賠償。


(B)Amount of penalty.—
賠償金額


(i)First tier.—
第一等級(jí)
The amount of the penalty shall be determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances. For each violation, the amount of the penalty shall not exceed the greater of (I) $5,000 for a natural person or $50,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation.
就每一違法行為，處罰金額不超過(guò)兩者中較大數(shù)額者：(I) 5000美元/自然人，或5萬(wàn)美元/法人；或 (II) 違法責(zé)任人因違法行為所獲得的金錢收益。


(ii)Second tier.—
第二等級(jí)
Notwithstanding clause (i), the amount of penalty for each such violation shall not exceed the greater of (I) $50,000 for a natural person or $250,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation, if the violation described in subparagraph (A) involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement.
若違法行為涉及欺詐、欺騙、操縱、有意或疏忽違反監(jiān)管要求，處罰金額不超過(guò)兩者中較大數(shù)額者：(I) 5萬(wàn)美元/自然人，或25萬(wàn)美元/法人；或 (II) 違法責(zé)任人因違法行為所獲得的金錢收益。

(iii)Third tier.
第三等級(jí)
Notwithstanding clauses (i) and (ii), the amount of penalty for each such violation shall not exceed the greater of (I) $100,000 for a natural person or $500,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation, if—
(aa)
the violation described in subparagraph (A) involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement; and
(bb)
such violation directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial losses to other persons.
若違法行為涉及欺詐、欺騙、操縱或有意或疏忽違反監(jiān)管要求，且違法行為導(dǎo)致他人巨大損失或使其面臨巨大損失的重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，處罰金額不超過(guò)兩者中較大數(shù)額者：(I) 10萬(wàn)美元/自然人，或50萬(wàn)美元/法人；或 (II) 違法責(zé)任人因違法行為所獲得的金錢收益。

(D)Special provisions relating to a violation of a cease-and-desist order.—
關(guān)于違反行政禁令的特定規(guī)定
In an action to enforce a cease-and-desist order entered by the Commission pursuant to div 78u–3 of this title, each separate violation of such order shall be a separate offense, except that in the case of a violation through a continuing failure to comply with the order, each day of the failure to comply shall be deemed a separate offense.
若違法責(zé)任人未遵守SEC發(fā)出的行為禁令，對(duì)行政禁令的每一次違反，視為一次違法行為（從上述條文，我們可知，賠償金額以每一違法行為為計(jì)算單位，因此違法次數(shù)與賠償金額直接相關(guān)）；若責(zé)任人持續(xù)不遵守行政禁令，則未遵守的每一天算一次違法行為。

(5)Equitable Relief.—
衡平法救濟(jì)
In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.
SEC可為投資人之利益向聯(lián)邦法院提起衡平法救濟(jì)。衡平法救濟(jì)是前述金額賠償之外的救濟(jì)，通常會(huì)要求SAE和涉案高管進(jìn)行或不進(jìn)行某一特定行為。
SOX Section 304(a)&(b) [15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)&(b)]

(a)Additional compensation prior to noncompliance with Commission financial reporting requirements
財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告被發(fā)現(xiàn)不合規(guī)前CEO和CFO所獲報(bào)酬的返還
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for—
若上市公司因重大違法違規(guī)導(dǎo)致財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表重述（本案中SAE進(jìn)行了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表重述），則CEO和CFO應(yīng)向上市公司返還：

(1)
any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and
上市公司被重述的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表公告后12個(gè)月期間所獲得的獎(jiǎng)金、激勵(lì)性質(zhì)或股權(quán)性質(zhì)的報(bào)酬；以及

(2)
any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period.
在該12個(gè)月期間將上市公司股票出售所獲利潤(rùn)。

(b)Commission exemption authority
The Commission may exempt any person from the application of subdiv (a), as it deems necessary and appropriate.
SEC可視情況必要和適當(dāng)時(shí)豁免CEO、CFO返還前述款項(xiàng)。
Disgorge illgotten gains
退還非法收益

Ordering Defendants Hastings, Whiteley, Beatty, and Scott, and Relief Defendants O’Neill and Hastings, to disgorge, with prejudgment interest, all ill?gotten gains or unjust enrichment derived from Defendants’ illegal conduct as set forth in this Complaint;
除前述金額賠償和CEO&CFO報(bào)酬返還外，SEC在控訴狀中還要求涉案高管退還因違法行為所獲得的一切非法收益、不當(dāng)?shù)美袄ⅰ?/font>

其他
此外，SEC新聞稿(press release)披露，紐約南區(qū)Attorney’s Office將向Hastings(前CEO兼董事長(zhǎng))提起刑事指控。
本文SEC訴狀來(lái)自https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2020/comp-pr2020-251.pdf
本文僅作討論，不構(gòu)成律師法律意見(jiàn)。若想進(jìn)一步了解本案例，可添加小法微信交流。